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Summary
In 2015 Attorney David Hoffman and his colleagues published the results of an
extensive independent review in which he concluded that the American Psycho-
logical Association (APA) interacted with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
and colluded with the Pentagon in an effort to curry favor with these agencies
and to protect and expand the role of psychologists in the interrogation programs
of the CIA and Department of Defense (DoD). As part of this collusion, the
APA’s bureaucracy took great efforts to ensure that its ethics policies did not
conflict with the policies of the Pentagon – even doing so in defiance of the will
of its membership. Many members of the APA greeted the revelations of the
Hoffman report with shock. While psychologists should be dismayed by the
revelations of the Hoffman report, we argue that anyone familiar with the history
of American psychology’s entanglement with the national security state should
not be surprised to learn that psychologists were designing and legitimizing torture.
In order to understand the APA-DoD collusion we turn to the historical roots
of the torture crisis and the structure and culture of the APA. We explore the
roots of disciplined psychology’s role in collaboration with the security apparatus;
analyze the institutional structures, ideological formations and cultural norms
within the APA that have enabled this collusion; and investigate and challenge,
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from a phenomenological and theoretical point of view, one of the biggest scandals
that American psychology has faced.
The American Psychological Association (APA) in its self-understanding is
the »leading scientific and professional organization representing psychology
in the United States.«1
Founded in 1892, the association developed from a handful of founding members
to over 117,000 fellows, members, associates, and affiliates in 2016. This number
does not represent the highest level of membership that APA has achieved in its
history, and the torture complex may be one reason why psychologists have, in
recent years, resigned, not renewed or not initiated their membership. It should
be mentioned that the Association for Psychological Science (APS) (formerly
known as American Psychological Society), currently with about 26,000 members,
was organized in the late 1980`s as a competing academic association. Critics
would cursorily refer to APS members as »positivists« or »naïve empiricists,« as
this society represents psychologists with a commitment to (natural) »science« –
reflecting the interests of academic scientists more than those of professional
psychologists.
Although a detailed account of the history of APA, with its headquarters in
Washington, DC, cannot be provided here, we would like to mention that the
shift in focus to professional psychology has led to some fascinating contradictions.
For example, APA is much more »diverse« in terms of theoretical and empirical
outlooks than APS, to the degree that, for instance, psychoanalysts, humanistic
psychologists, peace psychologists, philosophical psychologists, psychologists of
religion and spirituality, feminist psychologists, and even qualitative and activist
psychologists, can find a home in one of APA’s 56 divisions (which would be
impossible in APS). In addition, APA has not shied away from getting involved
in progressive causes (e.g., support for same sex marriage2). On the other hand,
APA as a large organization with a large bureaucracy – one that depends on
money, power, and recognition – has been involved in lobbying activities at
various levels of authority, and has been proactive for reactionary causes, as the
torture complex demonstrates.
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Psychology’s focus on the individual and disciplinary pressures to remain
value-neutral leads to a training that leaves many American psychologists political-
theoretically naïve. Yet, because of the need to prove the usefulness of psychology,
APA’s leadership has often collaborated with the ruling government of the day.
Despite a self-understanding that psychology is simply a helping profession, a
variety of historical examples have challenged this notion, and have rather sugges-
ted a political dimension to psychology’s activities (e.g., Gould, 1996). Thus,
the crucial ethical-political question for psychology, as a »helping profession,« is
this: Who is being helped? In recent years, this question has become particularly
salient regarding the torture complex. After enormous internal and public pressure
regarding an assessment of the role of the APA in the War on Terror, the APA
Board of Directors asked in 2014 the law firm Sidley Austin in Chicago to conduct
an independent review of the collusion between APA and the Bush administration
on »enhanced interrogation techniques« in the so-called War on Terror and its
aftermath.
The result of the investigation, known as the Hoffman Report, indicated a
profound collusion between APA and government agencies. In July of 2015 At-
torney David Hoffman et al. (2015) published the results of this extensive inde-
pendent review. The 542-page document concluded that the APA collaborated
with the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) and colluded with the Pentagon
(headquarter of the Department of Defense) in an effort to curry favor with these
agencies and to protect and expand the role of psychologists in the interrogation
programs of the CIA and Department of Defense (DoD; Pentagon). Further,
the report also concluded that APA continued to work with the Pentagon even
as credible evidence surfaced that psychologists were designing tortures (see also
Soldz, 2008).3
The following are several key conclusions cited directly from the Hoffman
report: (a) »Key APA officials … colluded with important DoD officials to have
APA issue loose, high-level ethical guidelines that did not constrain DoD in any
greater fashion than existing DoD interrogation guidelines. We concluded that
APA’s principal motive in doing so was to align APA and curry favor with DoD.
… to create a good public-relations response, and to keep the growth of psycho-
logy unrestrained in this area« (Hoffman et al., 2015, p. 9); (b) »APA officials
engaged in a pattern of secret collaboration with DoD officials to defeat efforts
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by the APA Council of Representatives to introduce and pass resolutions that
would have definitively prohibited psychologists from participating in interroga-
tions at Guantanamo Bay and other U.S. detention centers abroad« (p. 9); (c)
»we found that current and former APA officials had very substantial interactions
with the CIA in the 2001 to 2004 time period, including on topics relating to
interrogations, and were motivated to curry favor with the CIA« (p. 10); (d) »we
found that the handling of ethics complaints against prominent national security
psychologists was handled in an improper fashion, in an attempt to protect these
psychologists from censure« (p. 10).
Our purpose here is not to give a full account of Hoffman’s finding, which
may be found in the report’s executive summary (Hoffman et al., 2015). Instead
we seek to address why the torture complex occurred, why psychologists should
not be surprised by the findings of the Hoffman Report, and why something
similar to the torture complex is likely to happen again. We address these questions
from a phenomenological and theoretical perspective. By phenomenology we do
not mean a specific philosophical methodology but rather an approach that takes
the first-person perspective into account that is combined with theoretical reflec-
tion.
Situating ourselves
Before beginning our phenomenology, it is important to ground this analysis in
actual persons. Dan Aalbers has been an active participant in the efforts to reform
the APA and many of his assessments are based on his experiences while working
inside the APA. The APA leadership’s attempts to thwart his efforts, as well as
those of his collaborators and co-authors, are spelled out in section VIII of the
Hoffman report. Many of his first-person accounts are based on his experiences
while serving on APA committees, his collaborations with members of the APA’s
Council of Representatives (COR) and interactions with APA senior staff. This
creates an ethical quandary because the people with whom he was been interacting
with did not expect to be speaking into a public record, and most people assume
that emails and phone conversations are private. At the same time the prevention
of any further disciplinary complicity with entities that torture is a compelling
need, one we hope can be addressed, at least in part, through the writing of this
history. In an effort to balance the interests of privacy with a relevant analysis of
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historical events, the accounts have been partially anonymized, speakers are
identified in terms of group membership, such as »senior staff« and »committee
member.«
Thomas Teo has been involved with APA to the degree that he has been a
member and fellow for many years, he has co-edited a book with APA (Green,
Shore & Teo, 2001), is a former editor of the APA Journal of Theoretical and
Philosophical Psychology (2009–2014), has participated regularly in its conven-
tions, and serves as current president of APA Division 24 (Society of Theoretical
and Philosophical Psychology). He has also published an article on critical psy-
chology in one of its flagship journals (Teo, 2015). Thus, APA has provided him
with opportunities for disseminating alternative ideas, and he has had good
working relations with APA at the rank and file staff level. In December 2016,
APA’s Public Interest Directorate just sponsored the conference »Adelante:
Meeting the Social and Legal Services Needs of Central American Refugees in
New York,« in which Division 24 participated. On the other hand, as a critical
psychologist, Thomas Teo has been appalled by the recent workings in the
higher bureaucracy, and has experienced first-hand how the references to bylaws
and rules make it often impossible to advance progressive causes. Such disciplinary
practices demand a critical analysis of institutional contradictions that includes
a critique of society, power, and bureaucracy.
The 2008 Referendum
In 2007 Dan Aalbers, with Brad Olson, Ruth Fallenbaum and Ghislaine
Boulanger invoked a never-used provision of the APA rules that allowed rank
and file (regular) members of the APA to petition to put legislation up for a direct
vote of the membership. This legislation known as the »Referendum« and which
they co-authored, banned psychologists from working for the authorities running
illegal sites such as the CIA black sites and the naval camp at Guantanamo Bay
(hereafter referred to as GITMO).4 While the membership referendum passed
by a majority of 59%, the APA bureaucracy worked behind the scenes to prevent
the implementation of the referendum. Aalbers and his allies spent the next 7
years trying to enact the will of membership and to ensure the removal of psycho-
logists from GITMO (Hoffman et al., 2015). But how was it possible for the
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APA bureaucracy to prevent the implementation of the Referendum and to un-
dermine the will of the membership?
While much of the story is told in section VIII of the Hoffman report, a
few experiential details should be mentioned for analysis. Soon after the referen-
dum passed, the authors of the policy were told that the referendum could not
go into effect unless they participated with the adversaries of the referendum to
prepare a document that interpreted the referendum and made recommendations
on how to implement it. While we saw this as an attempt to rewrite and/or defang
the referendum, the lawyers we conferred with advised that courts would be un-
likely to intervene, unless we could convince a judge that all internal avenues for
enacting change had been exhausted.
While the panel (APA Presidential Advisory Group on the Implementation
of the Petition Resolution; PAG) was dominated by opponents of the referendum,
Aalbers and his co-authors came to the panel with an incentive to make recom-
mendations and demands that ensured that the referendum would be implemen-
ted. Ultimately, the panel produced a strong report that encouraged the APA to
take several strong actions including lobbying the United States Congress to es-
tablish a truth and reconciliation commission. However, the APA staff, working
with the president of the APA at the time, succeeded in ensuring that the report
was given the administrative status of »received« (see below), meaning that the
association was not obligated to enact any of its recommendations. In practical
terms, this meant that every concession and gain that had been made was treated
as nothing more than ink on paper. The staff had succeeded in defeating the
referendum.
Bureaucratic sabotage
As the Hoffman Report makes clear, senior APA staff had been working to align
APA policy with that of the Pentagon. The staff had found a way to stack the
APA Presidential Task Force on Psychological Ethics and National Security
(PENS) to ensure that the interests of the military psychologists dominated. The
staff worked to prevent the referendum from being implemented and wrote the
many strong-sounding but practically meaningless denunciations of torture.
While several presidents such as Ronald Levant (2005 APA President), Gerald
Koocher (2006 APA President) and James Bray (2009 APA President) played
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important roles in keeping APA and DoD policies synchronized, the senior staff
members were the power behind the throne, and played a much more significant
role in the torture scandal than did any single president.
In analyzing the success of the senior APA staff over the years, it is worth
borrowing from Jacoby’s notion of bureaucratic sabotage. Jacoby (1973) collects
brief historical case studies in which bureaucrats succeed in preventing their pu-
tative leaders from enacting policies. For example, when the social democrat
Rudolf Hilferding (1877–1941) was appointed Finance Minister in Germany in
1923, his subordinates found a way to deliver the ministerial documents to him
in a manner that prevented him from performing his duties. Only when Hilferding
informed the ministerial staff that he would avoid undertaking any radical reform
efforts was he allowed to receive the documents he needed to perform his duties.
While the APA’s efforts were subtler, they were no less examples of bureau-
cratic sabotage. Instead of playing the role of servant to the membership, it became
clear that the APA staff actively sought ways to ensure that the referendum would
never be implemented. While the APA staff presents themselves as the servants
of the membership, they are the de facto leaders of the association. As Strauss
(1961) notes, in modern bureaucracies, the official is no longer truly subordinate
to his or her superior. Jacoby (1973) invokes Max Weber who noted that even
the Czars had trouble instituting policies that were opposed by their underlings.
Specialized knowledge is a form of power in a bureaucracy, and the functionary
typically has superior understanding to that of his or her putative superior (see
also Graeber, 2015).
Bureaucrats are therefore what Strauss (1961) calls the »ruling servants« of
given organization; they are able to survive transitions in power and typically rule
longer than elected leaders (Jacoby, 1973). As Jacoby notes, the ability to survive
transitions in power necessitates a conservative mindset. Dramatic changes in
policies are threats to the power and position of the bureaucrat. Because the
bureaucrat’s advantaged position relies upon a superiority in existing corporate
»knowledge,« a shift in policy represents a potential of a shift into an area of ig-
norance and a potential loss of power of the putative subordinate over his or her
putative superior. In addition, senior bureaucrats who are not alienated from
their work product feel a sense of ownership in relation to past or existing policies;
they do not want the next elected leader to undo their work because it is their
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work. This sense of ownership is particularly profound in an organization like
the APA that changes its president every year.
When the referendum passed, the then president of the APA called Dan
Aalbers to congratulate him on his victory, and also to confirm the decision –
made by unelected APA staff – that the referendum would not be implemented
until and unless Aalbers agreed to sit on a panel with the adversaries of the refer-
endum in order to decide how it would be implemented. The APA leadership
had decided that the referendum could not go into effect immediately and, besides,
Aalbers was told, no one inside the APA understood what the referendum was
saying. In a comic moment during the conversation, the president declared: »If
your theory is that I am being controlled by my staff, you are wrong. Dead wrong!«
– a statement immediately followed by »[The staff] will be in touch with the de-
tails.« From that moment on, the elected leader was no longer involved, and the
staff »handled the details.« Notably, the letters signed by the presidents are often
written by the APA staff, the members of the presidential task forces are chosen
by the staff, and the staff oversees the products of these task forces.
Another factor enabling the rule by the »servant« is the alienation that most
psychologists feel towards the APA. For many academics, the APA is an organiz-
ation that puts together a conference and membership is a mechanism for securing
discounts on journal subscriptions. The alienation felt by most academics is even
more profound with many clinicians viewing the APA as nothing more than a
means by which to secure insurance (Boulager, 2012). Neither the academics
nor the clinicians know about, or particularly care about, the actions of »invisible«
bureaucrats.
As Hoffman et al. (2015) note, the staff have the ability to control the APA
by carefully selecting the members of the various task forces and committees.
This raises questions of how and why the elected leadership came to view task
forces that were dominated by a particular group of psychologists – in this case,
by military psychologists, as legitimate. A partial answer comes from an unlikely
source: The value that the elected leadership places on diversity. As the old saying
goes, »the road to hell is paved with good intentions,« and if ever there was a
scandal deserving that adage it is this one. The APA in its organizational structure,
practices and culture has an authentic appreciation of the values of diversity,
pluralism and multiculturalism. Yet, the naive application of these values was an
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important factor in the domination of the APA by one group of psychologists –
namely, military psychologists.
Dialectics of diversity
When task forces are formed, the APA takes great efforts to ensure a diversity of
participants. Indeed, in 2005, the same year the association produced the PENS
report that aligned APA policy with the policies of the department of defense,
the association also produced a report on diversity; further, the president who
did the most to censure critical voices inside the PENS task force formed a
committee to ensure that the association’s theoretical commitment to diversity
was reflected in concrete institutional structures (Report of the APA Task Force
on the Implementation of the Multicultural Guidelines, 2008).
As the philosopher Taylor (1994) notes in his classic text on multicultural-
ism, liberal understandings of recognition require that individuals be recognized
as free and equal individuals who interact with each another on a neutral plane.
Further, the failure to recognize the other can do real damage to the individual
who is not being recognized or is being misrecognized. A critical myth of the
orthodox liberal understanding is that all people who are interacting are, by virtue
of their natural endowment, equal individuals, and thus any restrictions on recog-
nition or participation in a dialogical encounter is morally suspect.
Taylor (1994) posits a politics of difference as opposed to a politics of
equality. The former is sensitive to the real power differentials between the indi-
viduals in a dialogical encounter. On the basis of a politics of difference, one
could advocate not just for compensatory treatment to the less powerful individual
in the form of policies, such as affirmative action, but also for restrictions on
powerful individuals. The Canadian philosopher Taylor has also restrictions on
English language signs in the French-speaking Canadian province of Quebec in
mind (although one should debate the dialectics of restriction in this example as
well). If two individuals with unequal power enter into dialogue and pretend that
they are equal, the interests of the powerful will inevitably dominate. If instead
the power differential is acknowledged, the egalitarian ideal of recognition may
be achieved.
Inside the APA, Division 19, the Society for Military Psychology, is one of
the smaller divisions, its membership ranging between 400 to 600 psychologists
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between 2005 and 2013.5 Yet, a military psychologist has been present on each
one of the APA task forces involved in the crafting of APA policy on interrogation.
To many APA insiders, the need to have a military psychologist involved in the
crafting of interrogation legislation is either self-evident (if the policy might impact
that individual, it is important to have him or her involved), or justifiable based
on intellectual diversity. The latter may help to explain, for instance, why for the
PENS report both military and peace psychologists were included on the task
force (see Hoffman et al., 2015); and why both peace psychologists and military
psychologists have been co-authors of the various loophole-ridden anti-torture
policies passed through the years (cf., Report of the APA Member-Initiated Task
Force to Reconcile APA Policies Related to Psychologists Work in National Se-
curity Settings, 2013). Within the APA, diversity can take on an ideological form:
A panel made up of both military and peace psychologists gives the appearance
of diversity and assumes that the interests of two small and potentially competing
divisions have been given voice.
But from philosophical, social and personal analyses we know that peace
psychologists and the military psychologists do not have equal power, and that
when the two are put on a panel together, it is inevitable that the interests of the
more powerful dominate (in this case the military psychologists) (Taylor, 1994;
see also Hughes, 2010, regarding the dominance of military over civilian professors
within military educational institutions in the United States). It is critically im-
portant to note that not all expressions of values of diversity, pluralism and
multiculturalism within the APA are ideological in the same sense. This analysis
applies only to the treatment of military psychology as a force that needs special
treatment in the name of inclusiveness and diversity. Inside the APA one can say
that the military psychologists are misrecognized as second-class citizens deserving
of compensatory treatment instead of as representatives of a powerful organization.
In short, in this case, dominant powers have been mistaken for a dominated
group.
When Aalbers was informed that the referendum would not be implemented
until or unless a task force decided how it should be implemented, a staff member
explained that the referendum process was flawed, and that, while we had followed
the rules, we had accomplished something unseemly. The staff member explained
that when the APA constructs a policy, it involves all possible stakeholders. Rather,
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we had worked on our own, and had even rejected offers to collaborate with the
APA board of directors to revise our policy: »This is not how we do things,« said
the staff member. At the initial meeting of the PAG task force, a military psycho-
logist expressed the opinion that, »this is what is good about the APA,« that it
would form a panel as diverse as this one.
The microphysics of power (n’oubliez pas Foucault)
All APA task forces that meet at least once in Washington, DC, are required to
produce a consensus report. Any task force member can withhold consensus and
thus prevent the task force report from being accepted by the 162 members of
the APA Council of Representatives as an »accepted« policy, that is as a policy
that obligates the association to take particular actions.6 While the ability to
withhold consensus is a power that all task force members hold, the military
psychologist is in a unique place of having a specific end in mind that supports
an institution outside of the APA (DoD). If the result of a task force report does
not dovetail with DoD policy, the military psychologist can dissent, which will
almost certainly result in a report with a »received« status, that is, a status that
transforms the proposed actions from obligations to recommendations.
Status and superior knowledge also factor into the military psychologists’
power within the American context. In addition to all the structural factors that
allow military psychologists to be the most powerful members of a task force (the
financial power of the DoD, the strong support from the APA bureaucracy, the
high social status of soldiers at this time in the history of the USA), the military
psychologists, like the bureaucrats, usually know more about the issue at hand
than do civilian task force members. Yet, the civilian members play an important
legitimizing role in such task forces. Their role in the task force deliberations of
the task is usually inconsequential from an intellectual content perspective, for
it usually lacks the substantive expertise in defense or security studies of the mil-
itary psychologists. But in offering a perspective that is not prejudiced by prior
opinions or expertise – that reflects intellectual integrity if not intellectual content
– the civilian perspective nevertheless serves to legitimize the final product of a
task force, and helps to provide it with at least the appearance of intellectual di-
versity.
189Journal für Psychologie, Jg. 25(2017), Ausgabe 1
In addition to task force members that provide an appearance of intellectual
diversity (e.g., military psychologists and peace psychologists), there is another
essential component of an APA panel: members with very little to contribute, in
terms of substantive content or any other form of intellectual input. Such members
might have little to offer because they lack expertise or interest in the subject, or
they may simply lack power or confidence. While such individuals contribute
little of substance or intellectual import, they perform two vital functions: they
help to maintain the group norm and, after a task force report is released or a
policy is passed, they persuade the rest of the association that the process that
produced the report was a good and fair one.
Like the mindguard in the group think phenomenon (Janis, 1982), the
person with the least to contribute often regulates the discussion. Consider, for
example, this extract from a member of the presidential advisory group: »I’m
greatly impressed by the progress you all are making, and look forward to an
opportunity to look over a semi-final draft with my usually fairly reliable fine-
tooth comb. MANY thanks to all of you for the collegial, productive way in
which this document is being drafted« (Anonymous, 12/18/08). Or: »I believe
things are moving in a productive collegial direction, and I DO intend to share
whatever thoughts occur to me once a draft is closer to completion (and I expect
any editorial or other suggestions that I might make at that point are likely to be
seen by everyone as "friendly amendments") (Anonymous, 12/18/08). Or: »I
believe it is a fine, forceful, and productive statement and would like to commend
all of you for this excellent product. I’ll reread it once more and have decided
NOT to suggest any further changes unless I believe they are critical. All the best
to each and every one of you! You make me proud to be a member of the APA«
(Anonymous, 12/18/08, emphasis added).
While such members of the task force made no substantive contributions
to the text of the report, they nevertheless: (a) praised all the members of the
committee before any edits were made; (b) reminded the advisory group that it
was important that the conversations remain »collegial« or »friendly,« that is,
polite and upbeat; and (c) expressed admiration for the APA or for the task force
report, or a belief in the goodness of the process that was used to produce the
report. This practice of issuing praise – often excessive praise – made it difficult
to raise concerns, because the task force members were primed to expect support
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from other task force members, and any words of critique would leave a sour
taste.
Jean Maria Arrigo who, along with Mike Wessels, served on the PENS task
force as a peace psychologist and later denounced the report had similar observa-
tions about the PENS report process: »The chair came in from time to time to
keep us on task, keep us on time, and to generally praise everybody in sight. She
sounded like the wife of a diplomat. Everybody was praised up and down for
everything possible. I found it sort of embarrassing. She was very nice about all
this. It was very smooth. Almost to the point that I felt it was insincere. But
anyway, she was very nice« (Arrigo, 2005, p. 16).
The reports that are generated by task forces need to be approved by putative
ruling body of the association – the APA’s elected Council of Representatives
(COR or Council). How was it possible that bureaucrats ruled a body as large
and diverse as the APA Council? Here the mechanism of control is quite banal
as the structure of the APA ensures that the Council members are under-informed,
over-worked and required to make decisions without deliberation. The APA
COR is made up of members who meet twice a twice a year during two or three
days of 8-hour sessions. In practice, these sessions often run overtime and many
of the most important decisions are made at the last possible minute, while the
legislators may think about planes they need to catch. Deliberation is actively
discouraged because it would extend the already long meetings. Council members
who attempt to amend bills are occasionally chided and told that wordsmithing
on the floor in Council is a bad practice, and are instead encouraged to adopt
bills on the basis of their confidence in the abilities of the putative authors.
Indeed, the document used to orient new council members offers the fol-
lowing advice: »Ask yourself if you are going to the microphone because you have
something important to say about the item under discussion or for some personal
reason« (Council of Representatives Handbook, American Psychological Associ-
ation, 2016, p. 8). While there are undoubtedly Council members who choose
to speak for egoistic reasons, this is certainly not true of all members and this set
of instructions primes Council members to see deliberation, questioning and
critique as expressions of narcissism. Thus, Council members who remain quiet
and who vote for whatever the task force has produced are constructed as good,
community-minded individuals who trust their colleagues while people who raise
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doubts on the floor are constructed as narcissists who place their individual
judgements above the careful deliberations of highly qualified individuals.
Another »banal« structural matter that makes it not only possible but likely
that Council members will be unfamiliar with the bills they are considering is
turnover. The APA Council is split between representatives coming from divisions,
which represent academics and practitioners, and representatives from states and
territories, almost all of whom are practitioners. The state representatives serve
for three years, and only a handful of divisional representatives serve for more
than a year or two. We believe it is fair to assume that most psychologists are
more interested in psychology than in bureaucracy. We have also experienced
that the unelected bureaucrats and a small handful of Council members who
travel from division to division know more about how Council works than do
the vast majority of elected members.
Except in rare circumstances, boards and committees will have vetted bills
that appear before council, and it is not unusual for this vetting process to take
more than two years. In effect, this means that many of the people who will have
voted on the legislation will have had no direct experience with the legislative
history of the bill, unless they had chosen to read the full history in the lengthy
agenda book. In practice, most members do not read the history and choose in-
stead to base their decision on the recommendations made by the boards and
committees. The patterns of time, turnover, and voting one finds in task forces
are multiplied in boards and committees. Constant turnover allowed the ethics
committee, for instance, to become a fiefdom for the putative servants of the
elected leaders. The hired bureaucratic person in charge knew more than anyone
else and had more time to make decisions than any other members.
It is difficult, if not impossible, to overestimate the role that the concept of
politeness plays inside the APA. Politeness is an ideological framework, a rule-
governed concept that influences the perceptions of the true and the good. Polite-
ness and the concepts captured by the gravitational pull of that superstructure,
such as collegiality and non-partisanship, form an evaluative standard by which
one can judge the value of a piece of legislation. Indeed, politeness, collegiality
and disinterest are values placed above and beyond the values of academic rigor
and good practice.
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In this context, the role of the task force members who know the least, and
who have no particular interest in the outcome of a given policy, comes to the
fore. The same expressions of mutual admiration that make critical viewpoints
unlikely during task force deliberations now serve double duty: they provide
Council members who have not read or understood the task force report a reason
to vote in favor of a bill because »authors are so very impressive and the process
that produced it was good and fair.« The associated value of disinterest is codified
in two requirements: one, that all APA task forces make recommendations on
the basis of consensus, and two, that representatives are obliged to vote in the
»interest of the APA« and not the interest of one’s constituency. The requirement
that representatives not represent those who voted for them appears in the
Council Handbook: »Any individual who is a member of the Council of Repres-
entatives has a primary ‘fiduciary duty’ to APA. Fiduciary duty includes the duty
of care and the duty of loyalty. The latter duty means that while a Council
member can be informed about issues by the group that elected/appointed the
member to Council, ultimately she or he must vote in the best interests of APA
as a whole, after hearing all points of view and considering all information before
Council« (American Psychological Association, 2016, p. 3).
This requirement, of course, benefits those who have the power to define
the »best interests of APA as a whole.« As Pope (2016) has noted, »the best in-
terests« are defined as guild interests. This means that APA should concern itself
with gaining access for psychologists to grant and job opportunities. At one point
during the debates about the PAG, an opponent of the referendum exclaimed,
»Don’t you understand? We are talking about people losing their jobs!« In guild
consciousness, even a job at a torture camp is an interest to be given equal value
to that of avoiding entanglement with torture – a point that was underlined
during the PAG debates by a staff member who stated, »We are the American
Psychological Association, not Amnesty International.« In that context, the
meaning of the statement was clear, that while Amnesty International concerns
itself with human rights, »we,« the APA, concerns itself with securing job oppor-
tunities for psychologists.
The observation that psychology is a field that individualizes structural issues
is hardly a novel one (e.g., Davies, 2015). This individualization has greatly aided
the interests of those who seek to keep psychologists employed in places like
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Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Throughout more than the decade-long battle to reform
the APA, the reformers have continually emphasized the logic of the United
States’ torture program. Under the Bush administration, any interrogation that
involved a psychologist was ipso facto a legal interrogation. If a psychologist was
either observing or participating in an interrogation, this was sufficient proof that
the interrogators did not specifically intend to torture the victim. This meant
that a psychologist who did nothing more than observe or, indeed, who was
present at the site of the interrogation or who was available to intervene in case
of an emergency, provided the instantiation that the interrogation was a legal
one (see also Aalbers, 2015, Bradbury, 2005a, Bradbury 2005b, Mitchell, 2016).
Further, those who seek to maintain good relations with the Pentagon, and
to keep the psychologists working at places like Guantanamo Bay, paint an image
of the heroic psychologist who is able to overcome the constraints placed on him
or her to do the good or moral thing: »Mr. Hoffman, in his analysis, appears to
believe that military personnel, fearful of the impact upon their careers and unable
to withstand external pressures, are prone to obey all orders, regardless of legality
or, in the case of psychologists, ethical constraints« (Harvey, 2016, np). Not only
does this statement frame the issue in way that is often compelling to Americans
– by celebrating the individual who struggles against constraints, instead of focus-
ing on policy – it also appeals to the ideal of politeness. Once the policy is indi-
vidualized, it can be personalized and embodied. To suggest then that a psycho-
logist cannot resist pressures to avoid illegal orders, is to demonstrate a lack of
faith in one’s colleagues. It also suggests a lack of polite deference that colleagues
extend to each another. The anti-torture activists were defeated time and time
again because their arguments were perceived as being rude and less collegial than
those of the proponents of the status quo (Marcuse’s, 1965, concept of repressive
tolerance comes to mind as well).
Advocates for keeping close ties with the DoD have made good use of dis-
ciplinary patriotism. For many psychologists, the goodness of psychologists is
tautological. The work that psychologists do is good work. If a program includes
psychologists it is therefore good, and we know it is a good program because
psychologists are involved (cf. Koocher, 2006; James & Freeman, 2008; Kennedy,
2012). Yet, here is no evidence that programs that do not involve psychologists
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are inferior to those that do involve them. The tautological disciplinary patriotism
is based, in part, on an ignorance of our own history.
History repeats itself
This is not the first time psychologists have been involved with torture. The
CIA’s infamous Central Intelligence Agency (1963)7 interrogation manual is
largely indebted to the psy-professions. The so-called KUBARK interrogation
manual contains a section on the interrogation of »resistant sources« that includes
advice on how to administer »the principal coercive techniques of interrogation:
arrest, detention, deprivation of sensory stimuli through solitary confinement or
similar methods, threats and fear, debility, pain, heightened suggestibility and
hypnosis, narcosis, and induced regression.« (Central Intelligence Agency, 1963,
p. 84).
The techniques included in KUBARK were based on the work of a group
of Cold War social scientists who analyzed the Soviet interrogation program.
These scholars went through a remarkable transformation as part of their entan-
glements with the CIA (see also Solovey & Cravens, 2012). In the mid 1950’s
they first published their analyses of the Soviet torture program and were clearly
disturbed by the techniques and took great pains to explain that these techniques
were uniquely the product of communist regimes. Hinkle and Wolff (1957) were
careful to explain that such inhumane treatment is only possible in regimes where
legal protections are meaningless. Biderman (1957), reflecting on the irrationality
of the use of a set of techniques known to produce false confessions to uncover
»truth,« lets his readers know that this irrationality is reflective of the irrationalities
of communist regimes.
Albert D. Biderman’s (1923–2003) attitude had shifted by 1961 as evidenced
by an editorial he wrote for the book on the The Manipulation of Human Beha-
vior (Biderman & Zimmer, 1961): »Several scientists have reported on the possible
applications of scientific knowledge that might be made by the most callous in-
terrogator or power. The results of their thinking are available here for anyone
to use, including the unscrupulous« (p. 9). He and the other contributors (»cold
warriors«) to the edited volume were by this time openly working to make the
technology of false confession production available for exploitation by the forces
of western democracy. But it would be a mistake to view the person who did
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more than anyone else to help the CIA create an »interrogation« manual, and
whose work would inform the abusive practices carried out at Guantanamo Bay,
as evil (Central Intelligence Agency, 1963; Committee on Armed Services United
States Senate, 2008). Indeed, Biderman wanted to be remembered for his contri-
butions to the social democratic reforms of the great society and for his opposition
to racial discrimination, not for his work on interrogation – which, according to
his archivist, just paid the bills (Duff, 1987). Biderman, like so many inside the
APA, was a person of good intent who was blind to the effects of his work.
Biderman was given an academic’s dream: his own think tank. The oddly
named Bureau for Social Science Research Inc (BSSRI) was certainly bureaucratic
in its structure and self-understanding, but it was not an official government
bureau. Funded by the CIA, it was a private think tank that produced analyses
for the CIA. While the most important work to emerge from the BSSRI– Bider-
man’s synthesis that gave rise to KUBARK – remains classified, much of its
content can be inferred from KUBARK itself, and from the bibliography of
sources that Biderman left behind (Bureau of Social Science Research, 1963).
Indeed, these differences between the secret reports written by the Cold War
scientists and their publicly published articles were minimal. Hinkle and Wolff
were especially adept at making their productions serve double duty; their secret
reports written for the CIA were rough drafts for their published articles in the
open literature (compare Hinkle and Wolff 1956, and Hinkle and Wolff, 1957).
To better understand how a progressive social scientist, horrified by the practices
of the communist other, helped to reverse engineer a system of torture, we need
to return to an analysis of bureaucracy and to suggest some parallels between the
BSSRI and the APA.
Weber’s (1946/1921) famous Iron Cage of modernity involves the replace-
ment of substantive-value rationality with formal-procedural rationality (see also
Kalberg, 1980). Biderman takes great pains to explain that he does not have a
telos to his research. Accordingly, he is simply doing good science, and it is the
responsibility of others to decide what to do with his research. Likewise, in the
case of the APA, if the rationalized interest of an organization is to maximize its
members’ employment (and earning capacity), then a discussion of ethical sub-
stantive rationality will be replaced with considerations of proper procedure: Did
the scientists who worked for the BSSRI follow the appropriate research protocols?
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Was a given action carried out in accordance with the rules and bylaws of the
association? Did staff members act outside of their roles as defined by the organ-
ization?
Specialization alienates the bureaucrat from the impact of their policies.
While high-level bureaucrats (like Biderman and the APA ethics director) do not
necessarily feel alienated from their own knowledge products, they need not
concern themselves with the end result or the use of these same products or
policies. Just as the fully rationalized assembly-line supervisor need only be con-
cerned with the employee’s ability to produce the perfect piston, and not with
the effect of the combustion engine on the environment, likewise Biderman was
able to assemble the best research on how to be manipulate human beings without
not concerning himself with how this information might be used.
Arendt (1963) informs us that Eichmann never wanted to put his policies
into effect; this was a job for someone of a lower position. Thus, we submit that
this banal aspect of bureaucracy helps to explain the phenomena that Hoffman
et al (2015) referred to as »deliberate avoidance … cutting off one’s curiosity
through an effort of the will« (p. 67). If the APA bureaucrats had concerned
themselves with their effects of their policies, then, we suggest, they would not
have been able to continue to do their jobs. Rather they embraced what Graeber
(2015), more recently, labels as »the bureaucratic principle of value-free rule-
bound neutrality« (p. 183) that is not neutral at all.
The future does not look bright
In the wake of the torture scandal the Obama administration decided to make
interrogations humane and effective by turning to the profession most implicated
in the torture scandal – psychology. The Obama administration formed the High
Value Detainee Interrogation Group (HIG) to »conduct research in intelligence
interviewing and interrogations« (High Value Detainee Interrogation Group,
n.d., p. 3; Wakins, 2015) – a mandate not dissimilar to that of the BSSRI. Like
the BSSRI, the HIG academics have a single customer for their knowledge
product, and that customer decides whether the work can be made public, and,
thus, is subject to ethical review by the scholarly public. The HIG researchers
will also face similar pressures to those faced by BSSRI scientists to tailor their
research to the needs of the interrogators. Notably, the HIG research committee
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is headed up by Susan Brandon, a former figure in the Bush Administration, who
played a major role in the APA’s attempts to strengthen ties between the APA
and the CIA (Hoffman et al., 2015; Soldz, Raymond, & Reisner, 2015). While
one might comfort oneself with visions of strong-willed individuals who are
capable of resisting the temptations to contribute to unethical activities, history
gives us little reason to pin our hopes.
Neither can we pin many hopes in the APA to serve as a bulwark against
abuses. While the APA finally passed a bill in August of 2015 that removes psy-
chologists from Guantanamo Bay, which puts the association on the side of in-
ternational law and prevents psychologists from participating in individual na-
tional security interrogations, proponents of strong ties between the DoD and
APA are seeking to change this bill and to codify the requirement that military
psychologists serve on any task force that considers policies that might impact
the military. Such proponents are also seeking to change the wording of the
membership referendum to allow psychologists to serve in illegal settings. Further,
a group calling itself the PsychCoalition8 has formed to question the validity of
the Hoffman Report, and is running a campaign using tactics similar to those
used by campaigns seeking to raise doubts about climate science (see also Proctor
& Schiebinger, 2008).
Perhaps most importantly, the structure of the APA remains a bureaucracy
untouched. While some of the most important actors mentioned in the Hoffman
Report have resigned or have been fired, the structures that gave power to their
actions, and to their mission, have remained in place. Unless the APA transforms
its governing body into a deliberative one, and unless it returns decision-making
power to the elected leadership, a return to a strong relationship between the
DoD and APA may be inevitable.
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